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GULF WAR GUINEA PIGS: IS INFORMED
CONSENT OPTIONAL DURING WAR?
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our mili-
tary commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as
quickly as possible and with the greatest degree of protection
possible for American and Allied servicemen and women. I've
told the American people before that this will not be another
Vietnam.
And I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best
possible support in the entire world. And they will not be asked
to fight with one hand tied behind their back.'
United States Captain Barry Kaplan and paratrooper Darrell Clark
were members of the fighting force that participated in Operation Desert
Storm and "restored a sense of pride in the U.S. military."2 On January
16, 1991, the United States led a multinational force into the Persian Gulf
to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The attack, sponsored by the
United Nations, lasted just over a month, and the Allied forces pre-
vailed.' Operation Desert Storm was not like Vietnam: the soldiers who
fought in the Gulf War had the support of the American people, and were
given a hero's welcome upon return to the United States.4
Captain Kaplan's duties took him through Shiite refugee camps, across
desert sands, over strongholds of the Iraqi Republican Guard, and past
raging oil fires in Kuwait.5 Just two months after serving in the Persian
Gulf, though, Kaplan became sick and was removed from active duty.
Complaining of excessive gastrointestinal problems, malaria-like night
sweats, ringworm-like rashes, chest pains, temporary vision loss, and
bleeding gums, Kaplan was admitted to several different hospitals and
1. President George Bush addressed the nation on the night of January 16, 1991, as
he sent troops to battle in the Gulf. President: 'The world could wait no longer,' PHIL.
INOUIRER, Jan. 17, 1991, at 10-A.
2. Certain Victors, Uncertain Victims, THE PHOENIX GAZE'TE, Sept. 5, 1995, at B8.
3. MICHEL MOUSHABECK, BEYOND THE STORM, 371-72 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel
Moushabeck, eds., 1991).
4. Mary Beth Oliver, News Viewing, Authoritarianism, and Attitudes Toward the Gulf
War, in THE MEDIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 152-53, 161 (Robert E. Denton, Jr., ed.,
1993).
5. The Morning Edition: Authorities Deny Existence of Gulf War Syndrome (National
Public Radio Broadcast, Jan. 19, 1996).
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eventually was classified as "100 percent disabled" by army doctors.6
Kaplan retired after ten years in the Army.7 Even though doctors diag-
nosed Kaplan with maladies ranging from chronic myocarditis and gastri-
tis to chemical hepatitis, the Army claims that there is no physical
condition that can account for his symptoms. 8
Clark also faced an array of environmental hazards while he was in the
Persian Gulf. Like many of his comrades, Clark developed symptoms
(asthma and recurring pneumonia) of the affliction known as "Gulf War
Syndrome." 9 More troubling than his own illnesses, however, are the
birth defects with which Clark's daughter Kennedi was born, and which
Clark believes are a direct result of his participation in the Persian Gulf
War.' ° Kennedi Clark was born without a thyroid and needs daily hor-
mone treatments just to stay alive. In addition, Kennedi suffers from be-
nign tumors that create red, knotted lumps of blood vessels on her
eyelids, lips, spinal cord, and throat. The tumors, called hemangiomas,
cannot permanently be removed and distort her speech and threaten her
life. 1
Clark and Kaplan are two of the many soldiers who unknowingly took
pyridostigmine bromide, an experimental drug administered to Gulf War
soldiers. Some doctors believe that the combination of the experimental
drug and the heavy pesticide use during the Gulf War may have caused
the birth defects in the children of Gulf War veterans.'2 President
George Bush, whose administration sent troops into Kuwait, apparently
agrees. During a recent interview, President Bush suggested that the ex-
perimental inoculations used to combat chemical warfare may have
poisoned the soldiers instead.' 3 In preparing for the possibility of war,
the United States Department of Defense ("DoD") grappled with the
threat of Iraq's well known chemical and biological weapons capabili-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Kenneth Miller, The Tiny Victims of Desert Storm, LIFE, Nov. 1995, at 51.
10. Id. at 49-50. See also Jane Bowling, Gulf War Chemicals Caused Birth Defects,
THE DAILY RECORD, Aug. 14, 1996, at 1 (reporting on a suit filed by three families claim-
ing that their children's birth defects are a result of the military's negligent exposure of
soldiers to pesticides, petrochemicals, and certain immunizations).
11. Id. at 49.
12. Id. at 52, 54, 56, 60-61.
13. Mike McDaniel, Bush, Frost Talk About Gulf War, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 15,
1996, at 1.
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ties.' 4 The possibility that Iraqi president Sadam Hussein would use
chemical and or biological weapons against American troops was real:
Hussein had employed chemical nerve agents both against his own peo-
ple and on Iranian nationals during the Iran-Iraq War.'5 The United
States Interagency Intelligence Group reported to then Defense Secre-
tary Dick Cheney that Iraq had biological and chemical weapon plants in
several locations, and that Sadam Hussein would "consider using... bio-
logical warfare to save the regime from falling.' 16 DoD sought ways to
protect soldiers against such weapons use;. research revealed two drugs
that, although unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, could
potentially provide soldiers with an internal defense against chemical and
biological weapons.' 7 DoD petitioned the FDA to waive the "informed
consent" requirement, thereby allowing DoD to administer the two in-
vestigational new drugs to U.S. troops without first obtaining their in-
formed consent.'" The waiver, approved on a temporary basis, permitted
DoD to issue pyridostigmine bromide vaccine and anti-botulism vaccine
to troops without obtaining their informed consent. 19
It is widely accepted in the medical field that a physician must obtain
the informed consent of a patient before conducting any experimental or
research procedure.2" Legislation mandating that doctors or researchers
14. John Hanchette, Pentagon Worried About Gulf Illness During Desert Storm Fight-
ing, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS News library, Curnws file.
The defense department was well aware of Iraq's extensive use of mustard gas
and nerve agents during Baghdad's long war with Iran through most of the 1980s.
Intelligence monitoring counted 19 major battles in which Iraq unleashed chemi-
cal weapons on Iran from artillery or aircraft, and Sadam killed approximately
5,000 Kurdish civilians in a well-publicized attack on Halabjah.
Id. DoD also was aware that Iraq had the capability to use anthrax and botulism toxin as
weapons. Id.
15. Amy E. Smithson, Chemical Weapons: The End of the Beginning, THE BULL. OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1992, at 36, 37.
16. Hanchette, supra note 14.
17. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, 103RD CONG., IS MILITARY RE-
SEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS' HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A CENTURY 10-
11 (Comm. Print 1994); see also Jill C. Keeler et al., Pyridostigmine Used as a Nerve Agent
Pretreatment Under Wartime Conditions, 266 JAMA 693, 693 (1991) (reporting on the pre-
treatment effects of pyridostigmine bromide for nerve agent exposure during wartime).
18. Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics; Determination that Informed
Consent is Not Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52, 814 (1991) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50).
19. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 21; see also
George Annas & Michael Grodin, Our Guinea Pigs in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1991,
at A21 (opining that although the waiver obtained by the DoD may make it legal for
military physicians to administer experimental agents to soldiers without their informed
consent, it is unethical, and therefore inappropriate).
20. THOMAS A. MAPPES & JANE S. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 206-15 (3rd ed.
1996]
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obtain their patient's informed consent demonstrates the importance as-
signed to informed consent.2 ' Furthermore, a doctor's failure to obtain
the informed consent of a patient before performing a surgical procedure
may leave the doctor open to tort liability.22 Thus, although the status of
the law regarding informed consent seems clear with regard to medical
experimentation and research on human subjects, it is less clear when
those human subjects are in the military.
Over the past fifty years, American military personnel have been sub-
jected to government sponsored research and experimentation.23 Caught
up in the quest for atomic knowledge, DoD justified exposing unwitting,
nonvoluntary human subjects to radiation by citing national security in-
terests. 24 So-called "nuclear vets" were exposed without their knowledge
to varying levels of radiation to determine at what level such exposure
would become dangerous to humans. 25 During the Cold War, DoD, in
conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, began experimenting
with lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD") on human subjects.26 Again, the
human subjects used in the LSD experiments were not aware of the na-
ture of the tests being performed, and in no way consented to such test-
ing. Both projects were initiated by DoD and the Central Intelligence
Agency to hasten the development of United States military technology
in the areas of brainwashing and interrogation techniques.28
Regardless of DoD's motives or goals in conducting these experiments,
1991). See also Ethics in Biomedical Research, ISSUES IN MED. ETHics, July-Sept. 1996, at
91-92.
21. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (1995); 32 C.F.R. pt. 219
(1996). See also Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report
676, 677 (1995) (outlining federal policy governing human subject research since 1974).
22. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (doctors have a duty
to disclose relevant information about benefits and risks of a proposed treatment); Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990) (physician's research on body parts
patient consents to have removed is relevant information); Hernandez v. United States,
465 F. Supp. 1071, 1073-74 (D. Kan. 1979).
23: STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 1-2.
24. ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, Final Report 455,
457-87 (1995).
25. ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 24, at
19-21.
26. S. REP. No. 94-755, at 385-87 (1976). The general program of LSD testing on non-
consenting subjects was called MKULTRA. Id. at 389. See also STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON
VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 9.
27. Id. at 393-94.
28. Id. at 392-94. There was a common belief among those who carried out the LSD
experiments in the 1940s and 1950s that the Soviets were trying to produce LSD, and/or
trying to buy the world's supply of the chemical. The Soviets were thought to have devel-
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the fact remains that they were carried out without conforming to any
ethical, medical, or legal standard of human subject research.29 More-
over, the judicial system has provided little relief to the victims of these
medical experiments because DoD conducted the experiments. The judi-
ciary has traditionally given a great deal of deference to DoD in its inter-
nal operationsi as long as those operations were in the interest of national
security or conducted during time of war.3"
While not shrouding the experimental nature of its work in secrecy to
the same degree as it has in the past, DoD again used military personnel
as human guinea pigs in the Persian Gulf War.3' Prior to sending troops
into combat in the Gulf, DoD requested that the FDA allow DoD to
administer investigational new drugs to be used on Gulf War troops.32
The DoD request was significant because the military was asking a fed-
eral government agency to waive the statutorily conferred informed con-
sent rights of all personnel involved in the Persian Gulf War operation.33
Today, Persian Gulf War veterans suffer from illnesses ranging from
chronic fatigue and skin rashes to severe reproductive dysfunctions in-
cluding genetic disorders (children born with birth defects).' Approxi-
oped ways to use LSD for brainwashing and interrogation, as well as to harass, kill, or
disable Allied personnel. Id.
29. ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 24, at
206-07.
30. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
31. In 1994, bioethicist Arthur Caplan testified before the Senate Veterans Affairs
Committee that the use of pyridostigmine bromide and botulism vaccine on "large popula-
tions for purposes other than they were originally designed ... in circumstances in which
they had never been tried, out in the desert ... [falls] into the category of experimental,
innovative, investigational - - - that makes it research." Use of Investigational Drugs Dur-
ing Gulf War Qualifies as Research, Bioethicist Caplan Testifies, Drug Research Reports,
BLUE SHEET, May 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Blue File.
32. 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1990).
33. Id.
34. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 48. The
twenty-five most common symptoms, reported by a surveyed group of 150 Gulf War veter-
ans, are: fatigue (65), skin problems (61), rashes (50), memory loss (59), blackouts/forgets
where they are (5), joint pain (55), headaches (52), personality changes (44), diarrhea (32),
muscle pain, weakness, spasms, tremors (29), pain (including back, shoulder, or neck pain)
(28), trouble with vision (24), shortness of breath (22), sleep disturbances (22), hair loss
(19), numbness (hands, fingers, feet) (19), dental problems/bleeding gums (18), reproduc-
tive problems (18), bleeding (16), sores (14), chest problems (pain) (12), abdominal/stom-.
ach pain (12), fever (10), nausea/vomiting (9), dizziness/staggering (10), sinus, nasal
discharge (10), sensitivity to light, smell, noise (9), children born with birth defects (7), and
partners with reproductive problems (16). Id. "Researchers so far have been struck by the
wide variety of symptoms claimed by gulf-war veterans and. their possible causes." Peter
Cary & Mike Tharp, The Gulf War's Grave Aura, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 8,
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mately 45,000 Gulf War veterans have developed symptoms that have
been linked to service in the Gulf, termed "Gulf War Syndrome. 35 Med-
ical experts, however, have been unable to determine the exact cause of
the problems suffered by vets.36 Military personnel who served in the
Gulf War were exposed to a number of potentially detrimental environ-
mental hazards: burning oil fields lit by retreating Iraqi troops,37 depleted
uranium,38 nerve gases, 39 and even common chemicals such as diesel
1996, at 34. United States Congressman Steve Buyer, who served as an Army Reserve
officer during the Gulf War, developed respiratory problems. According to Buyer,
sick soldiers complain of symptoms ranging from chronic fatigue to insomnia to
rashes to joint aches to colon infections to memory loss. Those troops ... may
have been exposed to such things as poison gases, diesel fumes, oil-fire smoke,
biological agents and parasites. Moreover, 250,000 soldiers took anti-nerve-gas
pills whose safety now is in question.
Id.
35. Miller, supra note 9. 10,142 veterans "have filed claims with the [Veterans Admin-
istration] for disability related to undiagnosed gulf-war illnesses." Cary & Tharp, supra
note 34, at 33. Only 526 of the above mentioned claims filed with the Veterans Adminis-
tration have been granted. Id.
36. David Brown, The Search for Causes, WASH. POST, July 24, 1994, at A19.
Although researchers began to investigate the various illnesses affecting returning Gulf
War veterans in late 1991, the results have been far from conclusive. The Centers for
Disease Control reported that Gulf War veterans were "unusually susceptible to a dozen
ailments - from rashes to incontinence, hair loss to memory loss, chronic indigestion to
chronic pain." Kenneth Miller, supra note 8, at 51. Pentagon researchers concluded, how-
ever, that veterans did not display any new or unique illnesses. Id. The conclusion of a
committee of independent experts assembled by the National Institutes of Health is that
"[t]here is no single disease or syndrome apparent, but rather multiple illnesses with over-
lapping symptoms and causes." Health Panel Finds No Single Cause for Gulf Veterans'
Illnesses, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1994, at 40.
37. Jessica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 481,481 (1994). See also William McLean, Gulf War Health
Damage Remains a Mystery, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Jan. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
38. Miller, supra note 9, at 52. Depleted uranium is a waste product from nuclear
reactors. Those troops most likely to have been at risk of high level radiation exposure
were those working in areas filled with the dust and debris of tank battles, and those sal-
vaging equipment that had been hit by shrapnel. Id.
39. 'Id. at 54. The presence of nerve and or mustard gases in the Gulf War is subject to
debate. Id. The Pentagon has denied that nerve and mustard gases were present during
the Gulf War, yet the British, Czech, and French governments detected both types of gases
during Allied bombing of Iraqi chemical plants. Id. Some Symptoms in Gulf War Vets Still
Unexplained (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 16, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. According to a landmark study conducted in 1975, even low-level exposure
to nerve and mustard gases has been shown to cause chronic illness and birth defects.
Miller, supra note 9, at 54.
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fue 40 and insecticides.4' The United States General Accounting Office
estimates that American soldiers were exposed to twenty-one potential
"reproductive toxicants."'42 Although the illnesses that comprise Gulf
War Syndrome have not been linked to any one cause, it has been sug-
gested that the side effects of many of the chemicals to which the soldiers
were exposed were exaggerated in personnel who took the drugs issued
by the DoD.43 DoD has been reluctant to acknowledge the veterans'
complaints as legitimately related to service in the Gulf War.44
Legislative and executive responses have been more encouraging.45
The Clinton administration reopened the investigation into Gulf War
40. Miller, supra note 9, at 52. Diesel fuel was sprayed around the soldiers to keep the
sand down. Id.
41. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 32-33.
Diethyl-m-tolamide (DEET) and permethrin were two of the most widely used insecticides
by U.S. troops during the Gulf War. Id
42. Miller, supra note 9, at 52. Some physicians who have treated Gulf War veterans
think that the general overload of chemical pollutants have made veterans' bodily fluids
toxic. Id.
43. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 32. In 1993,
Dr. James Moss, a scientist at USDA, conducted a study that showed that when pyridos-
tigmine was used in combination with a common insect repellent such as that used by Gulf
War soldiers, the pesticide became "almost seven times more toxic as when it was used
alone." Id.
44. Clintons Get Second Opinion on War Ills White House Pledges New Look at Gulf
Vets, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 15, 1995, at A3. The Department of Defense said it
found no clinical evidence for a new or unique illness or syndrome among Persian Gulf
veterans. Id. In a recent press release, United States Representative Joseph Kennedy
stated "[i]n the past month, the Pentagon has acknowledged that as many as 15,000 Ameri-
can troops may have been exposed to chemical agents during the Gulf War - but it took the
Defense Department five years to confirm veterans' exposure to these agents." Kennedy
issued the press release in response to the National Institute of Medicine's final report on
Persian Gulf War Syndrome, which concluded that "there is no evidence of a mysterious
chronic illness arising from military service in the Persian Gulf War .... Joe Kennedy,
Kennedy Calls for Probe of Department of Defense, Oct. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS
News Library, Curnws File.
45. United States Senator Robert Byrd recently proposed an amendment to the 1997
defense authorization bill that would expand medical benefits to children born with .birth
defects or other catastrophic illnesses that may be linked to their parents' exposure during
the Gulf War. See also The Veterans Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
446, 108 Stat. 4645 (1994) (authorizing the Veterans Administration to pay compensation
to Persian Gulf Veterans suffering from chronic disabilities resulting from undiagnosed
illnesses that became manifest either during Persian Gulf War service or to a degree of
10% or more disabling within a subsequent presumptive period, as determined by the Sec-
retary of Veterans Affairs); Grant to Support Research on Exposure to Hazardous Agents
and Materials by Military Personnel who Served in the Persian GulfWar, Pub. L. No. 103-
160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993); Authority to Provide Priority Health Care to Veterans of the
Persian Gulf War, Pub. L. No. 103-210, 107 Stat. 2496 (1993); The Veterans Health Care
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-585, 106 Stat. 4943 (1992).
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Syndrome in September 1995, pledging to leave "no stone unturned" in
investigating the mysterious illness.4 6 In January, 1996, the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Science announced that "there is
no evidence for a 'previously unknown, serious illness among Persian
Gulf veterans."' 47 The Institute of Medicine's assertion that Gulf War
Syndrome does not actually exist was met with skepticism by the Execu-
tive Director of the Gulf War Research Foundation, who noted that the
Institute of Medicine is "a government-funded organization contracted
by the Defense Department, with Defense Department funds, to evaluate
Defense Department progress on a politically controversial issue."48 In
June 1996, the Pentagon disclosed that "American troops may have been
exposed to nerve gas in the Persian Gulf."4 9 Finally, in August the Penta-
gon officially acknowledged that some American troops had been
exposed to chemical weapons in the Gulf. The Pentagon also acknowl-
edged that a number of United States government officials had known
about the troops' exposure since November 1991.50
This Comment examines the FDA decision that it was "not feasible"
for military personnel to give their informed consent to the use of investi-
gational new drugs during the Persian Gulf War. First, this Comment
traces the development of informed consent in the context of medical
experimentation both as a legal standard and as an ethical standard in
international law. Second, this Comment discusses the impact of interna-
tional laws and codes on United States law governing informed consent
for medical experimentation on human subjects. Third, this Comment
discusses the United States government's use of military personnel to
perform medical experimentation and research without informed con-
sent. Specifically, this Comment examines Cold War era research on the
effects of LSD on unwitting human subjects, and analyzes attempts of
affected military personnel to obtain judicial relief for harm resulting
from this testing. This Comment then evaluates the FDA decision to
grant DoD a temporary waiver eliminating the need to obtain the in-
46. First Lady Reopens Gulf Syndrome Probe, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 16, 1995, at A9.
47.' David Brown, Gulf Vets' Treatment is Lauded; Panel Finds No Evidence of Serious
New tSyndrome, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1996, at A19.
48. John Hanchette, Medical Agency: Pentagon Assessment of Gulf War Illness is OK;
Critics Protest, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 4, 1996.
49. Philip Shenon, Gulf War Illness May Be Related to Gas Exposure, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1996, at Al.
50. Robert Burns, Gulf Troops Weren't Told About Exposure to Chemical Weapons,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at 3. See also Secrecy Syndrome: Pentagon Should Fully
Explain its Actions in Gulf War Toxins Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, at B8.
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formed consent of American troops before administering investigational
drugs. Finally, this Comment examines the investigational new drugs
used on the Gulf War veterans. This Comment concludes that the FDA
decision that it was "not feasible" to obtain the informed consent of
American soldiers before issuing such drugs disregarded internationally
accepted medical standards as well as the United States' own Congressio-
nally established standards, and effectively turned U.S. military personnel
into guinea pigs. This Comment also concludes that the FDA should not
grant a permanent waiver allowing DoD to administer investigational
drugs without the informed consent of the persons receiving the drug.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMED
CONSENT AS A REQUISITE TO MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION
ON HUMAN SUBJECTS
A. International Law
1. The Nuremberg Code
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capac-
ity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exer-
cise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have suffi-
cient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the sub-
ject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experi-
mental subject there should be made known to him the nature,
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means
by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health pr
person which may possibly come from his participation in the
experiment.5 '
The atrocious medical experiments conducted at Nazi concentration
camps during World War II brought the issue of experimentatibn on
human subjects to the attention of the world community. The Nurem-
berg Code was developed as part of the final judgment rendered against
51. The Nuremberg Code, reprinted in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG
CODE, HUMAN RiGrrrs IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, 2, 2 (George J. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter Ti NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERO CODE].
1996]
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the twenty-three defendants in the Nuremberg Trials.52 Of the twenty-
three defendants, twenty were doctors, and nineteen of those held posi-
tions in the Third Reich. 3 The "crimes against humanity" with which the
defendants were charged were not just the perverted doings of a small
group, but were endorsed by the state and the medical profession. 4
Thus, the Nuremberg Code was "formulated in an attempt to establish
the substantive standards and procedural guidelines for permissible medi-
cal experimentation with humans.- 55
The Nuremberg Code has been called the "most complete and authori-
tative statement of the law of informed consent to human experimenta-
tion."'56 The Nuremberg Code was ultimately based on the testimony of
two American doctors and medical experts, Dr. Leo Alexander and Dr.
Andrew Ivy.57 Both men cite the Hippocratic oath as the basis for their
views on medical ethics.5 Ivy's testimony at the Nuremberg Trials was
no doubt influenced by his capacity as the representative of the American
Medical Association. 9 The first code of medical ethics adopted by the
American Medical Association was based on an early code written by
Thomas Percival.6" That earlier code included the subject of research
ethics, but did not address experimentation on humans.6' Possibly the
oldest code to assert that the patient should be a voluntary participant in
any research was written by William Beaumont in 1833.62 Finally, the
writings of French physiologist Claude Bernard, known to both Ivy and
52. Id. at 121.
53. Id. at 69.
54. THE NAZI DOCrORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION, 2, 2 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
55. Id. at 121.
56. George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in the United States
Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17, 21 (1991) (citing G. ANNAS ET AL., IN-
FORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 21 (1977)).
57. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 122.
58. Id. at 123. The Hippocratic Oath states: "I will follow that system of regimes
which, according to my ability and judgement, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and
abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous." Id.
59. See id. at 134.
60. Id. at 124. Dr. Ivy represented the American Medical Association at the Nurem-
berg Trials, and as representative of the AMA it is reasonable to assume that the AMA's
code of ethics influenced Dr. Ivy's testimony. Id. at 134.
61. Id. at 124. Percival addressed the need for experimentation to develop new thera-
pies and remedies. Furthermore, Percival stressed the need for sound methodology, and
asserted that the doctor should be "scrupulously and conscientiously governed by sound
reason, just analogy, or well-authenticated facts." Id.
62. Id. at 125. Beaumont was an American physician who carried out extensive non-
therapeutic experiments on one of his patients. Id.
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Alexander, forbade any experimentation on humans that might cause
harm.63
The ten principles of the Nuremberg Code were influenced by the testi-
mony of Drs. Ivy and Alexander. In addition, Ivy and Alexander each
brought their own professional experiences to bear: Ivy's testimony, for
example, focused primarily on the standards for conduct of human exper-
imentation.' 4 Ivy urged that research and/or experimentation conducted
on humans should be guided by three principles: (1) the voluntary con-
sent of the individual upon whom the experiment is to be performed must
be obtained; (2) the danger of each experiment must have been previ-
ously investigated on animals; and (3) the experiment must be performed
under proper medical protection and management.65 As expressed by
Nuremberg Prosecutor James McHaney6 in his closing argument, "it is
the most fundamental tenet of medical ethics and human decency that the
subjects volunteer for the experiment after being informed of its nature
and hazards. This is the clear dividing line between the criminal and what
may be noncriminal. '' 67 The final form of the Nuremberg Code was pro-
duced by a panel of four American judges who presided over the hear-
ings; it differed only slightly from the final memorandum submitted by
Dr. Alexander.68
2. Declaration of Helsinki: A Professional Response to Nuremberg
The Nuremberg Code was ultimately formulated "by jurists for use in a
legal trial."'69 In response to the atrocities revealed at Nuremberg, the
world medical community organized to develop a comprehensive set of
professional ethical codes and guidelines.7" In 1954, the Eighth General
63. Id. at 125-26. It should be noted that although Bernard did not condone experi-
ments that caused harm to the human subject, he did support the use of dying patients in
human experimentation that caused no suffering. Bernard does not seem to prohibit all
nonbeneficial experimentation but rather that which causes actual harm. Id.
64. Id. Dr. Ivy was a noted physiologist and research scientist. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 136. James McHaney served as the chief prosecutor for the United States at
the Nuremberg trials. McHaney delivered his closing arguments on July 14, 1947. Id.
67. Id. at 137. McHaney's statement was based on the testimony of Drs. Ivy and Alex-
ander. Id. at 136.
68. Id. at 134-37. Alexander had included a provision for consent by proxy in cases
where the patient/subject of the experimental treatment was unable to give consent due to
mental incapacity. The judges omitted this provision from the final version of the code,
presumably because it was not applicable to the case then at trial. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The World Medical Association ("WMA") was founded in 1947. In an early
statement adopted by the General Assembly, the WMA condemned the crimes committed
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Assembly of the World Medical Association ("WMA") adopted the
"Resolution on Human Experimentation: Principles for those in Re-
search and Experimentation" ("Resolution") in an attempt to regulate
experimentation. 71 The basic principles of the Resolution were very simi-
lar to those of the Nuremberg Code. The only notable difference was
that the Resolution distinguished between research on healthy subjects
(nontherapeutic) and research on unhealthy subjects (therapeutic). 72 The
guiding principle of Nuremberg - the free and voluntary consent of
humans subject to research or experimentation - was a primary feature
of the Resolution.73
The Resolution was essentially a draft document for the 1964 Declara-
tion of Helsinki, which is regarded as the "second formal attempt to place
human experimentation within a legal framework. 74 Under the Declara-
tion of Helsinki, the treatment of informed consent differs slightly de-
pending upon the condition of the patient. The Declaration of Helsinki
distinguishes between therapeutic and nontherapeutic treatment: consent
must be obtained for research conducted for nontherapeutic purposes,
whereas in a therapeutic situation, "[i]f at all possible . . . the doctor
should obtain the patient's freely given consent after the patient has been
by German medical practitioners and approved the judicial punishment of the crimes. Id.
The WMA first addressed the need for professional guidelines regarding human experi-
mentation in its 1954 publication "Resolution on Human Experimentation: Principles for
Those in Research and Experimentation." Id. at 157.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 156, 158. The relevant portion of the Resolution states:
In experimentation on healthy subjects, the researcher must take every step to
obtain fully informed, free consent. In experimentation on ill subjects, the re-
searcher must obtain the consent of the subject or his next of kin. The researcher
must inform the subject or the person who is legally responsible for the subject of
the nature of, the reason for, and the risks entailed by the proposed experiment.
Id. at 157.
73. Id. at 189, 341. See also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating "the standards that the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed ... stated that 'the voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential ... to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts."').
The Nuremberg Code is not cited in the Resolution. The Executive Director of the
WMA asserts that the framers of the Resolution did consult the Nuremberg Code, and in
fact discussed the Code during WMA meetings. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREM-
BERG CODE, supra note 54, at 158. Indeed, "[a]lthough nowhere documented, this very
conclusion has been reached by almost all commentators who have written about medical
research ethics." Id.
74. M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in Interna-
tional Law and Practice: The Need for International Regulation of Human Experimentation,
72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1609 (1981).
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given a full explanation."75 The Declaration of Helsinki was most re-
cently amended in 1989 ("Helsinki IV") and presents the informed con-
sent of human research subjects as a "basic principle. '7 6 Helsinki IV
expands the basic principle of voluntary informed consent by stating that
"[w]hen obtaining informed consent for the research project the physi-
cian should be particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent rela-
tionship to him or her or may consent under duress. 77
The Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki are the founda-
tional documents in the development of international law regarding med-
ical experimentation on humans.78 The principles embodied in these two
codes have also impacted the development of United States law regard-
ing informed, voluntary consent to human subject research. As a legal
model, the Nuremberg Code has been cited (albeit infrequently) by
United States courts and reflected in legislation.79 The Declaration of
Helsinki is considered a broader statement of ethical concepts,8" and is a
professionally accepted statement of appropriate guidelines for
experimentation.8 '
B. United States Law
The Nuremberg Code was promulgated by four American judges act-
ing under the authority of the United States military, 82 and following
American rules of procedure.83 Thus it would seem logical that United
States courts would adhere to the principles of Nuremberg. In practice,
75. THE NAZI DocrORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 332-33.
76. Id. at 339-41.
77. Id. at 341.
78. Id. at 160. Many of the human rights charters that have emerged from the United
Nations, including covenants against racism, sexism, torture, and genocide, are a result of
the Nuremberg proceedings. The 1948 charter of the United Nations mentions human
rights five times, an unprecedented development in world law. Id. at 178.
79. See id. at 183-94, 201.
80. Id. at 158.
81. Bassiouni et al., supra note 74, at 1611. The American Medical Association has
adopted the Code of Ethics on Human Experimentation of the World Medical Association.
Id.
82. THE NAZI DocTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 201.
83. Id. In addition, the prosecutors were American lawyers. The four judges, ap-
pointed by President Harry S. Truman, who adjudicated the Nuremberg Trial were: Harold
L. Sebring, Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida; Walter B. Beals (presiding judge),
Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington; Johnson T. Crawford, former
Justice of the Oklahoma District Court in Ada, Oklahoma; and Victor C. Swearingen (al-
ternate member), former assistant attorney general of Michigan from Detroit. Id. at 113.
In addition, the prosecutors were American lawyers. Id.
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however, the courts have not made use of Nuremberg or Helsinki docu-
ments in an authoritative context. The few existing citations to the Nu-
remberg Code have been in dissenting opinions. 84 However, the Code
and the Declaration of Helsinki have been influential in legislative at-
tempts to monitor and regulate human experimentation and informed
consent in the United States.
1. Legislation
The Federal Government did not become formally involved in regulat-
ing research until 1962,85 and took a more active role in regulating re-
search with human subjects in 1974.86 Nevertheless, the Clinical Center
at the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") employed the Nuremberg
Code as a working model of conduct as early as the mid-1950s.8 7 The
guidelines88 adopted by NIH in the mid-1950s were based on the "ten
commandments" of Nuremberg, and provided that "[e]very volunteer
must give his full consent to any test, and he must be told exactly what it
involves ... ,89 The fact that NIH promulgated such guidelines shortly
after the Nuremberg trials is significant because NIH is the national
health center and therefore could be seen as setting a standard for the
rest of the United States medical profession to follow.90 In 1966, NIH
adopted stricter regulations enforcing the informed consent rights of
human subjects.9 ' NIH implemented this tighter policy by refusing to ap-
84. Id. at 201. The Nuremberg Code has never been applied in a criminal case. Also,
no court has ever awarded damages to a person injured as the result of experimentation,
nor punished an experimenter, pursuant to the Nuremberg Code. Id.
85. Id. at 186. The Food and Drug Administration promulgated the Drug Amend-
ments Act of 1962 with the primary purpose of keeping "unsafe or useless" drugs off the
market. Much of the impetus for this Act was the realization in the wake of the
thalidomide disaster, that no state required physicians to inform patients that an experi-
mental drug was being used on them. The final version of the 1962 Act required experts
using investigational or experimental drugs to obtain the consent of their patients wherever
feasible. Id.
86. Id. at 187. The government adopted a set of regulations called the National Re-
search Act that governed the protection of human subjects involved in research supported
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id.
87. Id. at 185.
88. Id. The guidelines adopted were applied to the use of normal volunteers. Id.
89. Id.
90. Bassiouni et al., supra note 74, at 1621-22; THE NAZI DocTORS AND THE NUREM-
BERG CODE, supra note 54, at 185-86. The National Institutes of Health ("NIH") is re-
sponsible for "the support of a national program of health science research." Id.
91. THE NAZi DocTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 185. The
grantee institution had to consider the rights and welfare of research subjects, "the appro-
priateness of the methods used to secure informed consent, and the risks and potential
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prove new or continue old grants to grantees who failed to meet the
standard. 2
Congress attempted to regulate research with human subjects in the
National Research Act of 1974.93 Title II of the Act, the "Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research," established
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research ("the Commission"). 94 The Commis-
sion was charged with identifying "the basic ethical principles which
should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research in-
volving human subjects." 95 In its investigation, the Commission was to
consider the nature and definition of informed consent in various re-
search settings.96 Specifically, the Commission was charged with studying
and identifying specific requirements of informed consent for children,
prisoners, and the mentally infirm, because these groups were unlikely to
be able to give free and voluntary consent. By identifying special popula-
tions for consideration in application of informed consent to experimen-
tation, the 1974 Act essentially charged the Commission to consider any
factors that would affect the free and voluntary nature of the consent
given.97 The Act was a vehicle for the creation of a set of federal regula-
tions on research with human subjects. However, the enforcement mech-
anism of the Act limited the reach of the regulations to institutions
receiving funds from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
rather than to individual researchers.98 In August 1975, the Commission
medical benefits of the investigation." Id. (citing W. Curran, Governmental Regulation of
the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The Approach of Two Federal Agencies,
DAEDALUS: ETHICAL ASPECT OF EXPERIMENTATION wrTH HUMAN SUBJECTS, Spring,
1969, at 542).
92. Id. at 186.
93. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342
(1974).
94. Id.
95. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 187.
96. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 24, at
181.
97. Id. The adequacy of the information given, the competence and freedom of the
individual to make a decision, and the nature of the consent obtained from the subject are
all factors to be considered in evaluating the informed consent capacities of specific popu-
lations. Id.
98. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 187. The
Nuremberg Code, on the other hand, was directed toward individual researchers. A viola-
tion of the Nuremberg Code would result in the punishment of the researcher, including
possible criminal sanctions. A violation of the National Research Act is "punished" by a
denial of funding for the research project. Id. at 187-89.
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presented a comprehensive set of regulations, applicable to groups of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare related to government-
conducted or government-sponsored research.9 9 Research funded by
sources outside the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was
not affected.100
In 1981, the 1974 regulations were revised in response to the work of
the National Commission. 01 The revised regulations set out a detailed
informed consent provision, requiring that the researcher obtain patient
consent under circumstances "that minimize the possibility of coercion or
undue influence.' 1 2 One of the most striking provisions in the revised
regulations allowed an institutional review board 10 3 to waive the in-
formed consent requirement entirely if:
(1) the research involves no more than minimal risk to the sub-
jects; (2) the waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the
rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) the research could not
practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; or
(4) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with ad-
ditional pertinent information after participation."
By allowing an institutional review board' 015 to waive the informed con-
sent of a research subject, the 1981 regulations strike a completely differ-
ent path than previous regulations 10 6 or the Nuremberg Code. 10 7
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.. at 190. The Regulations apply to research that falls under the Department of
Health and Human Services, the successor to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. Id.
102. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1995).
103. Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs") are used, under the 1974 and 1981 regula-
tions, to determine whether or not a grantee has met the necessary requirements for a
government research grant. IRBs are usually composed of at least five people with differ-
ent backgrounds and fields of expertise, able to review proposals from both a scientific and
an ethical point of view. Id. at 187-88. The framers of the Declaration of Helsinki sug-
gested that establishing ethics committees to review research protocols would ensure that
the highest ethical standards would be maintained at all stages of research. Helsinki recog-
nized the possibility of conflict of interest present with ethics committees: "[ilt is important
to ensure that ethics committees do not take on a perfunctory status merely because agen-
cies providing grants require their sanctions." Ethics in Biomedical Research, ISSUES MED.
ETHICS, July-Sept. 1996, at 90, 92.'
104. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (1983).
105. The primary purpose of an IRB is to safeguard the rights and welfare of human
research subjects. It is up to the IRB investigators to determine whether proposed re-
search meets the required ethical norms, including informed consent. ROBERT J. LEvINE,
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 326 (2d ed. 1988).
106. The 1974 regulations required that the subject be "so situated as to be able. to
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Despite the rather broad treatment given to the definition of informed
consent by the 1981 regulations, prisoners, as a group, received more
strongly protected informed consent rights."' 8 Prisoners face the poten-
tial problem of exploitation, either real or perceived, because they are a
captive population. 1° 9 Exploitation of prisoners is possible because of the
potential for coercion, which may be subtle, and a relatively low public
interest in prisoners." 0 "[P]risoners may become 'volunteers' because of
their inability to resist material inducements.""' These concerns
prompted informed consent regulations even narrower than those in the
Nuremberg Code." 2 Only four kinds of research involving prisoners are
allowed. Of those four, three classes allow sociological-type studies."
3
The revised regulations thus provide an interesting contrast: the in-
formed consent of the average person is easier to waive under either the
Nuremberg Code or the 1974 regulations; however, special classes of peo-
ple, like prisoners, receive greater protection based on the fact that their
environment is inherently coercive.
The FDA, in conjunction with the NIH, controls the regulation of
human research experimentation in the United States." 4 Charged with
the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA exists to protect
the consumer from unsafe products." 5 The FDA has developed very spe-
cific rules regulating the use and testing of pharmaceutical products. Un-
like the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
exercise free power of choice without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress or other form of constraint or coercion." 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(c) (1975).
107. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 2. The first
provision of the Nuremberg Code states that "[tihe voluntary consent of the human subject
is absolutely essential." Id.
108. Id. at 191-92. The regulations also give specific consideration to children as a spe-
cial research class. Id. at 192-93.
109. Id. at 191.
110. Bassiouni et al., supra note 74, at 1613.
111. Id.
112. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 192.'
113. Id. "(1) the study of the possible causes, effects, and processes of incarceration
and of criminal behavior; (2) the study of prisons as institutions or of prisoners as incarcer-
ated persons; (3) research on innovative and accepted practices that have the 'intent and
reasonable probability' of improving the health or well-being of the subject." Id. The
fourth class covers medical research "on conditions particularly affecting prisoners as a
class (such as vaccine trials for diseases that are much more prevalent in prisons than
elsewhere)." Id. All research in the fourth class must be approved by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, who must publish his or:her intent to approve of such re-
search in the Federal Register. Id.
114. Bassiouni et al., supra note 74, at 162L
115. Id.
1996]
216 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:199
Human Services, FDA regulations are applicable nationwide without re-
gard to the source of funding." 6 FDA regulations regulate products, not
institutions, and exemptions are statutory. 117
Over the past forty years, informed consent rights under FDA regula-
tions have changed." 8 Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962,
partially in response to an outbreak of birth defects and infant deformi-
ties caused by the prescription of the drug thalidomide to pregnant wo-
men. 1 9 At the time thalidomide was being widely prescribed, and there
were no regulations requiring disclosure of the fact that the drug was ex-
perimental, beyond a warning on the drug label. The drug was prescribed
to 19,882 patients, including 3,760 women of child-bearing age.' 20 The
Drug Amendments became the basis for new FDA regulations updating
the 1938 statute. The new regulations required that in addition to being
safe there must be "substantial evidence" of a drug's therapeutic value.
Furthermore, new drugs could be used in clinical testing only on ap-
proved human subjects. Consent of the human subject was not addressed
in the regulations, but was made mandatory by a Senate amendment.'
21
Again, legislative concern with promulgating enforceable informed con-
sent requirements was obvious.
As legislated, the Senate's consent requirement left the agency without
discretion in obtaining patient consent.1 22 Currently, FDA treatment of
informed consent is based on specific statutory definition and regulation.
Current law requires the FDA to determine whether or not a researcher
must obtain informed consent from a subject by evaluating the "feasibil-
ity" of obtaining that consent:
[T]he obtaining of informed consent shall be deemed feasible
unless[:] (1)[t]he human subject is confronted by a life-threaten-
ing situation[;] (2)[i]nformed consent cannot be obtained from
the subject because of an inability to communicate with, or ob-
tain legally effective consent from, the subject[;] (3)[t]ime is not
sufficient to obtain consent from the subject's legal representa-
116. Id. at 1621-22.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1623.
119. Id. at 1622-23.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1624. Because the Senate made human subject consent to testing
mandatory, the FDA had no discretion in the application of the consent requirement. The
Senate provided only two exceptions to the informed consent requirement: "(1) if consent
was not feasible in the opinion of the investigator .... and (2) if consent was not in the best
interest of the subject." Id.
122. Bassiouni et al., supra note 74, at 1624.
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tive[; or,] (4)[t]here is available no alternative method of ap-
proved or generally recognized therapy that provides an equal
or greater likelihood of saving the life of the subject.123
Furthermore, the "consent" of a subject is defined in terms of amount
and quality of information given:
"Consent" means that the person involved has the legal capacity
to give consent, is so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice, and is provided with a fair explanation of perti-
nent information concerning his investigational drug ... as to
enable him to make a decision on his willingness to receive [the]
drug. This latter element means that before acceptance of an
affirmative decision by such person the investigator should care-
fully consider and make known to him... the nature, expected
duration, and purpose of the administration of... [the] drug;...
the hazards involved; [and] the existence of alternative forms of
therapy. 124
The FDA definition of consent is remarkably similar to the first provision
of the Nuremberg Code. 25 Proxy consent as considered under Helsinki
IV, is addressed by the exceptions to the FDA definition of feasible
consent.
The most recent federal attempt to protect human research subjects
was announced on June 18, 1991.126 The Federal Policy for the Protection
of Human Subjects (known as the "Common Rule") 127 sets forth require-
ments for the protection of human subjects involved in federally funded
research.' 28 Adopted by over twenty-five federal departments and agen-
cies, including DoD and the Department of Veterans Affairs,129 the Com-
mon Rule has its roots in the human subject protection regulations
123. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)(1)-(4) (1995).
124. Bassiouni et a]., supra note 74, at 1625. In formulating its definition of consent, the
FDA relied on the concepts embodied in the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of
Helsinki. Id.
125. See THE NAZI DocrORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 51, at 2.
126. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 24, at
675-77.
127. Id. at 675, 678.
128. Id; 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003 (1991).
129. The following federal agencies and departments adopted the Common Rule: The
United States Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Department of Commerce, Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion, International Development Cooperation Agency, Agency for International Develop-
ment, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice,
Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department of Veterans Affairs, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, National Science Foundation, Department of Health and
Human Services, and Department of Transportation. Id.
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promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in
1974.13° The Common Rule was designed to operate in conjunction with
existing FDA regulations governing the protection of human subject re-,
search;13 ' to that end, the informed consent requirements and the excep-
tions thereto are substantially the same as those provided by the, FDA.'
32
Current federal law prohibits the Department of Defense from con-
ducting federally funded research on human subjects without the prior
informed consent of the subject.133 The language of the provision re-
stricting DoD from using human subjects for experimentation does not
contain any exceptions,13 4 nor is there any legislative history or other
commentary suggesting that such exceptions or waivers of these provi-
sions would be acceptable. 135
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF NUREMBERG, CONGRESSIONAL/
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN
MEDICAL RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS WITHOUT INFORMED
CONSENT.
A. Cold War/LSD Experimentation
Despite the obvious intent of the legislature to regulate research on
human experimentation through the use of informed consent provisions,
judicial involvement in the area has been minimal. The courts have rarely
applied the principles developed at Nuremberg, or contained in the Hel-
sinki declarations. 36 Moreover, the courts have adhered to their tradi-
tionally deferential and passive role when considering research conducted
by the military.'37 The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Stan-
ley 138 demonstrates the extent to which the Court has refused to involve
itself with human subject research on military personnel.
130. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 24, at
676-77.
131. Federal Policy for the Protection Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003, 28,025
(1991).
132. Id. at 28,012, 28,016-17.
133. 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1995).
134. The provision allows a "legal representative" to give consent to research in the
case of research "intended to be beneficial to the subject." 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1994).
135. See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.D.C. 1991); United States v. Stanley, 438
U.S. 669 (1987).
136. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 201.
137. Id. at 218.
138. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
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Government sponsored research involving non-consenting 139 military
personnel was prevalent during the Cold War. According to a report is-
sued by the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") the DoD con-
ducted tests involving hazardous substances on hundreds of thousands of
human subjects between 1940 and 1974.140 The Central Intelligence
Agency and the DoD were fearful that countries hostile to the U.S. would
use chemical and biological agents against Americans. 14 1 In addition, of
particular interest to both agencies was the potential use of chemical and
biological agents to obtain information from enemy intelligence
agents.'4 2 Because these testing programs were considered highly sensi-
tive by the agencies conducting them,143 it is not surprising that military
personnel were often the test subjects.
In February 1958, Master Sergeant James B. Stanley volunteered to
participate in a program to test the effectiveness of protective clothing
and equipment against chemical weapons. 1'" Without his consent, Stan-
ley was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide
("LSD"). 145 The testing was conducted pursuant to a plan to study the
effects of LSD on humans.' 4 6 Because of the LSD ingestion, Stanley suf-
fered hallucinations, periods of incoherence and memory loss, and would
occasionally awake in the middle of the night and "without reason, vio-
lently beat his wife and children, later being unable to recall the entire
incident."' 47 Stanley was discharged from the military in 1969 after his
performance began to suffer, and his marriage dissolved shortly thereaf-
139. "Non-consenting" is used here to describe people who were not given the opportu-
nity to consent. "Non-consenting" does not refer to people who refused treatment and
were subsequently used as research subjects against their will.
140. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 15. Not all of
these tests were conducted on military personnel. For example, from 1951-1969, the DoD
conducted hundreds of open-air tests using bacteria and viruses that cause disease in
plants, animals, and humans. In 1968, the DoD released a deadly nerve gas from an air-
plane over an area approximately 80 miles south of Salt Lake City, Utah, killing nearly
6,400 sheep and exposing unknown numbers of people to the deadly agent. Although the
DoD initially denied responsibility for the act, it eventually reimbursed ranchers for the
loss of livestock. Id. at 6.
141. S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 27, at 385.
142. Id. The program of investigation began with the purpose of developing a defensive
program. Use of chemical and biological agents for brainwashing and intelligence gather-
ing was initially a secondary concern. Id.
143. Id.
144. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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ter.148 Stanley was not aware that he had been given LSD until 1978,
when he received a letter from the Army requesting his participation in a
follow-up study.149
Having been denied an administrative claim for compensation by the
Army, Stanley filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 150 Congress
enacted legislation that made "[a] suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act
the sole remedy for injuries 'caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission' of medical military personnel.' 151 The district court granted
the Government's motion to dismiss after finding that at the time the
research was conducted, Stanley was on active duty and his suit was
therefore barred by the rule established in Feres v. United States.152 The
Feres doctrine stated, "the Government is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of
or are in the course of activity incident to service.""'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that
Stanley's claim was barred by the Feres doctrine.154 The appellate court
conceded, however, that Stanley could proceed with his claim under Biv-
ens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.'55 Under Bivens, Stanley
argued he could bring an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act by
filing against individual officers. 56 The case was remanded, based on the
rationale of the Bivens decision, and Stanley amended his complaint in
order to add "unknown federal officers" for violation of his constitutional
rights.157 Stanley's amended complaint also charged that the Govern-
ment's "failure to warn, monitor or treat"' 5 s him constituted a separate
and distinct tort which was not incident to service according to the Feres
148. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 213.
149. Id. The letter requested the participation of "volunteers" who had participated in
the 1958 study. This was the first notification the government gave to Stanley following his
participation in 1958. Id.
150. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
151. Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383, 384 (D.D.C. 1979). Congress enacted
legislation to this effect on October 8, 1976. See 10 U.S.C. at 1089 (1976).
152. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672. The rule announced in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950), is known as the "Feres doctrine."
153. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
154. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671. While the Court of Appeals agreed that Stanley's claim
was barred under the Feres doctrine, it held that the District Court should never have
reached the merits of the case and dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
155. Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
156, Id. at 672.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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doctrine.' 59 The district court upheld Stanley's Bivens claim; the court of
appeals affirmed and again remanded to the district court to allow Stan-
ley to replead his claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
61
In a closely divided decision, the Supreme Court denied Stanley's
claim.16 1 Writing for a five to four majority, Justice Scalia denied Stan-
ley's Bivens claim because "[t]aken together, the unique disciplinary
structure of the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field
... dictate[s] that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military
personnel with a Bivens-type remedy .... 162 Scalia asserted that "Stan-
ley underestimates the degree of disruption" that would be caused by a
liability claim, and that such a claim would "call into question military
discipline and decision-making.' 63 The Supreme Court did not say that
under no circumstances may a serviceman bring a claim in civil court.
The Court indicated that it would hear a claim to prevent or halt the
violation of the constitutional rights of military personnel.' 64 However,
the Court effectively deprived Stanley of any viable avenue of redress; it
denied Stanley's FTCA claim and remanded the decision to the trial
court with orders to dismiss Stanley's Bivens claim.'
65
Due to the majority's complete disregard for the extraordinary circum-
stances involved in this case, Justice O'Connor wrote separately to em-
phasize the outrageous nature of the conduct involved. O'Connor noted
that while Feres stands for the proposition that "the special circumstances
of the military mandate that civilian courts avoid entertaining a suit in-
volving harm caused as a result of military service," the Government con-
duct involved in Stanley's claim "is so far beyond the bounds of human
decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered a part of
the military mission. ,166 O'Connor did not propose that the Court en-
gage in a case-by-case analysis of whether challenged military action did,
in fact, arise out of, or occurred in the course of, service. Rather, she
159. Id. at 673. Because the government's failure to monitor or treat Stanley techni-
cally occurred after he was discharged from the service, Stanley contends that action was
not incident to service. Id
160. Id at 674-76.
161. Id.
162. Id at 679 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 304 (1983)).
163. Id at 682.
164. Id. at 683.
165. Id at 686. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's reinstatement of Stan-
ley's claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act on procedural grounds: "[t]he Court of Ap-
peals ... had no jurisdi&ion to enter orders relating to Stanley's long-dismissed FTCA
claims." Id. at 678.
166. Id. at 709. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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asserted that "no amount of negligence, recklessness, or perhaps even
deliberate indifference on the part of the military would justify the en-
tertainment of a Bivens action involving actions incident to military ser-
vice. ' ' 1 6 7 Yet, O'Connor would outlaw military experimentation on
unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects as a matter of law.168
O'Connor went on to note that the United States military played an
"instrumental" role in the prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented
on human subjects. 169 Citing the first principle of the Nuremberg Code,
O'Connor concluded by saying "[i]f this principle is violated the very
least that society can do is to see that the victims are compensated.... I
am prepared to say that our Constitution's promise of due process of law
guarantees this much. ' 170 Thus, despite her statement that she would dis-
miss Stanley's claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act 17 1 and that there
was no remedy available for Stanley under Bivens, O'Connor would al-
low Stanley's cause of action because medical experimentation on unwit-
ting, nonvolunteer human subjects is wrong as a matter of law.' 72  As
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, concludes: "Soldiers ought not be
asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to their essential human
dignity.' '1 73
Stanley's status as a member of the military, thus, precluded the major-
ity not only from considering whether Stanley's injuries were "incident to
service," but also, from considering the undisputed fact 1 7 4 that the DoD
lied to Stanley about what they were doing. The majority opinion neither
reflects any acknowledgement or recognition of the extreme nature of the
acts committed by the Army, nor characterizes the Army's conduct as
unusual or inappropriate. 75 The effect of Stanley is to provide military
167. Id.
168. Bivens, 483 U.S. at 409.
169. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 710.
170. Id.
171. O'Connor concurred with the majority that the appellate court should not have
reinstated Stanley's cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and would dismiss
the claim on those (procedural) grounds. Id. at 708.
172. Id at 710.
173. Id. at 708.
174. Id. at 701. Justice Scalia states in his summary of the facts: "James B. Stanley...
volunteered to participate in a program ostensibly designed to test the effectiveness of
protective clothing and equipment as defenses against chemical warfare. Four times that
month, Stanley was secretly administered ... (LSD), pursuant to an Army plan to study
the effects of the drugs on human subjects." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
175. Annas, supra note 56, at 38.
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officials with unqualified immunity from claims by military personnel. 176
Only in extraordinary circumstances has the Court bestowed unqualified
immunity on officials who intentionally violate the constitutional rights of
citizens, 77 yet the majority does not squarely address the consequences
of its decision in this regard.17 Under the Stanley analysis it is difficult to
imagine a situation where military personnel would be protected from
experimentation without their knowledge and consent.
B. The Persian Gulf War and the FDA Waiver of Informed Consent
1. FDA Rule 23(d)
Responding to concern about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons
capacity, the DoD began to investigate medical treatments that might be
able to counter any such attack. 179 Research revealed two potentially
useful drugs in protecting against chemical nerve agents and botulism:
pyridostigmine bromide and botulinum toxoid.' ° Neither drug had been
approved by the FDA for use as intended by the DoD during the Gulf
War,18" ' and thus both were considered "investigational new drugs"
("IND") under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 8 2
Under the FDCA, unapproved drugs are generally prohibited from
use;' 83 however, the FDCA also authorizes the Secretary to promulgate
regulations that exempt drugs that are used exclusively for investigational
purposes.' 84 The first requirement of researchers using IND's is that they
obtain the informed consent of their subject. 185 The only exceptions to
the informed consent requirement are those authorized by the FDCA,
which are determined based on the "feasibility" of obtaining the subject's
informed consent. 186
176. Id. at 39.
177. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 694. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. THE NAZI DocTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 214.
179. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1372 (1991).
180. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 19-20. The
Department of Defense had spent years, and billions of dollars, trying in vain to develop
drugs that would provide safe and effective protection against chemical nerve agents and
biological toxins. Id. at 11.
181. See id
182. Id. at 19-20. Pyridostigmine and botulism toxoid are considered investigational
because they have not been approved for use against chemical nerve agents and botulism.
183. 21.U.S.C. § 355(a) (1994).
184. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i).
185. Id.
186. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (1995). Informed consent is deemed "not feasible" when: (1)
the human subject is confronted with a life-threatening situation; (2) when the human sub-
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In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Health for the Department of
Health and Human Services, the Assistant Secretary for Defense (Health
Affairs) asserted that the FDA should recognize a new regulatory excep-
tion under which informed consent would be deemed "not feasible" dur-
ing military combat exigencies.' 87 The Secretary of Defense urged that
although in peacetime "we believe strongly in informed consent and its
ethical foundations," during time of war the interest of an individual in
exercising his right not to take an unapproved drug may run counter to
the military mission. 8' Furthermore, DoD stated that "special military
exigencies sometimes must supersede normal rights and procedures that
apply in the civilian community. Consistent with this,. . . military mem-
bers may be required to submit to medical care determined necessary to
preserve life, alleviate suffering or protect the health of others."' 89
The FDA responded to DoD's request by promulgating rule 50.23(d)
as an interim regulation to allow the Commissioner of the FDA to deter-
mine whether obtaining informed consent from military personnel is fea-
sible in certain combat situations.' 9° The rule provides specific guidelines
detailing the considerations and findings the Commissioner must make
before determining that informed consent is not feasible. For example,
the DoD request may cover only a single military operation "involving
combat or the immediate threat of combat."' 91 The Commissioner will
also take into consideration such factors as: the proven safety and effec-
tiveness of the investigational drug; the context in which the drug will be
administered; the type of condition or disease the drug is intended to pre-
vent or treat; and "the nature of the information to be provided to the
recipients of the drug concerning the potential benefits and risks of taking
or not taking the drug."'192 Finally, the FDA will not waive informed con-
sent in the military context unless it can be documented that the use of
the drug in the combat situation serves the best interests of individuals
involved. 93
ject cannot adequately communicate his or her consent; (3) when there is not enough time
to obtain consent from a subject's legal representative; and (4) when there is no reasonable
alternative method of treatment available. Id.
187. Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologics, Determination that Informed
Consent is Not Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,815 (1990) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 50.23(d)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 52,815, 52,817.
191. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (d)(1).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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With the new regulation in place, DoD was able to obtain a ruling from
FDA Commissioner Kessler that obtaining the informed consent of the
Gulf War soldiers was "not feasible." According to DoD, pyridostigmine
bromide was issued to 696,562 American troops in the Gulf; it is esti-
mated that approximately two-thirds actually took the drug. 94 Whether
or not the troops actually took the drug depended on the order of each
major unit commander. 19 5 The majority of those troops who took
pyridostigmine were told that they had no choice. 9 6 Also according to
the DoD, the botulism vaccine was offered on a voluntary basis; however,
eighty-eight percent of the troops who received the vaccine said that they
were told that vaccination was not optional.197
Pyridostigmine bromide is a chemical nerve agent, intended in this in-
stance to enhance the effectiveness of other drugs that have been proven
effective in the treatment of nerve agent poisoning.' 98 Although pyridos-
tigmine is FDA-approved for use in treating a serious neurological dis-
ease, 199 the dosage given to healthy United States troops had not been
approved.2 °° That the troops received a dosage of pyridostigmine signifi-
cantly lower than that which the FDA had approved for other uses is not
relevant in evaluating the safety of the drug because the troops were
healthy.20' Pyridostigmine works when taken in combination with other
194. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 11.
195. Keeler et al., supra note 17, at 693.
196. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 47.
197. Id. at 11. There was some controversy surrounding the issuance of the vaccine to
women: the FDA Waiver Review Group recommended that the vaccine not be adminis-
tered to pregnant women, and that information about the vaccine be posted wherever it
was administered. Id. at 21. One hundred percent of the women who received the vaccine
and later participated in a survey of Gulf War veterans reported receiving no warning on
the risk of receiving the vaccine if pregnant. Id. at 47.
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id. at 12. Pyridostigmine has been used to treat a neurological disease, myasthenia
gravis, characterized by extreme weakness. That pyridostigmine has been used on people
suffering from myasthenia gravis does not imply that it is safe to use on healthy individuals,
or that the response of a healthy individual would be the same or similar to that of a
myasthenia gravis patient. Id. at 12-13. Furthermore, some of the side effects of pyridos-
tigmine bromide observed in myasthenia gravis patients include confusion, memory loss,
irritability, tremor, and ataxia. Id.
200. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 13.
201. Id. at 12. The Senate Report provides the following analogy:
Whereas the dosage of pyridostigmine bromide for patients with myasthenia
gravis may reach 120 mg every three hours, the dose for U.S. troops was only 30
mg every 8 hours. A good analogy is the use of insulin for diabetes mellitus; very
high doses of insulin are sometimes necessary to treat diabetics, but similar doses
could be fatal for non-diabetic individuals.
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nerve agent antidotes, such as atropine and 2-PAM.20 2 It is also effective
when taken before exposure to nerve gas.20 3 DoD research on pyridos-
tigmine20 4 revealed that in order for atropine to be effective the dosage
had to be .40 mg/kg. However, the dosage of atropine provided to Ameri-
can troops was based on earlier studies using inadequate dosages (.096
mg/kg) of atropine. 2 5 Thus, all other concerns about the safety and pro-
priety of pyridostigmine aside, it is unlikely that pyridostigmine provided
any protection because the dosage of the companion drug atropine was
inadequate.20 6
Finally, the safety of pyridostigmine was called into question by re-
search conducted by Dr. James Moss, a scientist at the Department of
Agriculture. Dr. Moss found that when pyridostigmine bromide was ad-
ministered to cockroaches that were subsequently exposed to diethyl-m-
tolamide ("DEET"), a common insect repellent, the DEET became al-
most seven times more toxic.20 7 Additionally, pyridostigmine becomes
four times more toxic when used in combination with DEET.2 °8 Because
DEET and many other common insect repellents were widely used in the
Gulf War, it is likely that individuals who took pyridostigmine bromide
were more vulnerable to pesticides, and that those exposed to pesticides
were more vulnerable to pyridostigmine bromide.20 9
Military researchers appear to have been aware of the potential
problems with pyridostigmine in interaction with other substances.210 An
early study from the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Chemical Defense stated that, based on initial observation, the pyridos-
tigmine bromide regimen "can be administered to virtually all soldiers
under wartime conditions without impairment of military perform-
ance." 211 Reactions to the pyridostigmine were measured in terms of
202. Id. at 16. Pyridostigmine bromide was administered to enhance the effects of atro-
pine and 2-PAM. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 26. According to the Senate Report, the FDA was not made aware of the
research data discovered during this study.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 32.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. Military researchers have stated publicly that pyridostigmine should never be
used after exposure to a nerve agent because of the damaging effects of the combination.
Id. at 33.
211. Keeler et al., supra note 17, at 695. The researchers based their conclusions on the
fact that about half of the reactions to pyridostigmine were "nonincapacitating." Id. at 693.
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their effect on military performance, not in relation to their effect on the
health of the individuals.212 Moreover, DoD researchers were concerned
about adverse reactions to pyridostigmine bromide to the extent that they
screened subjects to determine whether they were hypersensitive to
pyridostigmine before allowing the subject to participate in the test.213
Patients taking other medications were excluded from many studies, as
were smokers and people with abnormal blood pressure, asthma,
glaucoma, low serum cholesterol, gastrointestinal disorders, and urinary
or intestinal blockage.214 Women were excluded across the board.215
The other investigational drug administered to military personnel was
botulism toxoid, a vaccine intended to protect against botulism.216 The
Informed Consent Waiver Review Group, the FDA body that decides
whether or not to waive consent, heard from an FDA representative that
the existing supply of the vaccine was almost twenty years old;2 17 another
FDA reviewer pointed out that in 1973 the Centers for Disease Control
had considered terminating the distribution of the vaccine completely be-
cause of the number of persons who had negative reactions to it.2 18 In
addition, testing of the vaccine 219 suggested that it would be ineffective
against two of the five botulism toxins it was intended to protect
against.220 Furthermore, the manufacturer of the vaccine reported that
there had not been any studies on the effects of the vaccine in pregnant
The study reported that although nonincapacitating symptoms occurred "often," military
performance was not impaired. Id. The measure of intolerance to pyridostigmine was the
"perceived need for medical attention." Id. at 694.
212. STAFF ON SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 32.
213. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 28-29.
214. Id.
215. Because no studies were done on women, information is lacking regarding long
term side effects specific to women, such as menstrual cycle irregularities or disorders, and
breast cancer. Id. at 28.
216. Botulism is caused by one of the seven neurotoxins found in the bacteria clostrid-
ium botulinum. Id. at 13. When home canning was common in American households peo-
ple often got botulism as a result of food poisoning. Id The botulism vaccine used in the
Gulf War is produced by the Michigan Department of Health and was designed to protect
against five of the seven neurotoxins. Id. The vaccine is not a licensed product, hence the
investigational status of the drug. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at 34. According to a representative of the FDA's Center for Biologic Evalua-
tion and Research, there was concern that due to the age of the vaccine it would break
down into toxic products. Id. at 34.
218. Id. at 13-14.
219. An FDA reviewer pointed out that there was no data on the efficacy of the vaccine
in humans. The dosage estimates were based on studies conducted on guinea pigs. Id. at
13.
220. Id. at 14.
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women.
22 1
Like pyridostigmine bromide, the questionable safety of botulism tox-
oid vaccine was coupled with faulty and incomplete administration.
Although approximately 8,000 people received the botulism toxoid,222
the vaccine was administered to most military personnel after the onset of
the war. To be effective, the vaccine is supposed to be given as a series of
four injections, at 0, 2, and 12 weeks, and then again in 12 months.223
Because the war was brief, most troops did not receive more than the first
two injections, thus the effectiveness of the vaccine was reduced. 24
2. Doe v. Sullivan: Judicial response to the FDA Waiver of
Informed Consent
It was far from clear that botulism toxoid and pyridostigmine would be
either safe or effective when used as intended. Moreover, the administra-
tion of experimental drugs to military personnel is apparently contradic-
tory to the statutory prohibition of the use of DoD funds to conduct
research on human subjects. 225 The Court reconciled the FDA informed
consent exception for military exigencies with the Congressional mandate
that the informed consent of military personnel be obtained in defense
department research in Doe v. Sullivan.226
Doe, a serviceman stationed in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf
War, brought a claim alleging: (1) FDA Rule 23(d) was facially invalid
and outside the authority of the FDA under 505(i) of the FDCA;227 (2)
the DoD's use of investigational drugs without obtaining informed con-
sent was improper under the informed consent direction of the Defense
Department Authorization Act ("DAA"); and (3) the Government's use
221. Id.
222. Id. at 22.
223. Id. at 14.
224. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 27.
225. 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1995). The Act provides in pertinent part:
Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used for research
involving a human being as an experimental subject unless: (1) the informed con-
sent of the subject is obtained in advance; or (2) in the case of research to be
beneficial to the subject, the informed consent of the subject or a legal represen-
tative of the subject is obtained in advance.
Id.
226. THE NAZI DocTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 216-17.
227. Section 505(i) of the FDCA enables the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to promulgate regulations for exempting investigational use of drugs by experts. The regu-
lations have to require that investigators obtain informed consent from their subjects ex-
cept where in their professional judgment such consent is deemed not feasible, or contrary
to the best interests of the patient. 21 U.S.C. § 505(i).
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of drugs on a nonconsenting person is a violation of that person's Fifth
Amendment Due Process rights.228 Writing for the Court, Judge Gins-
burg declared that while the FDA Rule 23(d) "unquestionably involves a
military matter," Doe's claim does not necessitate that the Court review
the existence of a military exigency.229 The Court was willing to review
the claim because it involved review of a non-military agency, the FDA,
and thereby did not entail "judicial interference with the relationship be-
tween [a] soldier[] and [his] military superior[ ].,9230
The court first held that the FDA acted within its authority in promul-
gating Rule 23(d). 231 Next, the court addressed the apparent discrepancy
between the FDA Rule 23(d) and the language mandating informed con-
sent under the DAA.2 32 The court pointed out that the DAA only limits
the authority of the DoD.233 The Commissioner of the FDA is not regu-
lated by the DAA.234 Thus, the court denied Doe's claim that Rule 23(d)
is facially invalid.235
Finally, the Court dismissed Doe's Fifth Amendment Due Process
claim. The Court found that concerns raised by the DoD constituted "le-
gitimate government interests that . . . counterbalance an individual's
interest in being free from experimental treatment without giving in-
formed consent. '236 The Court found that the DoD had "legitimate gov-
ernment interests" in the uniform administration of drugs to troops to
prevent unnecessary danger, and in the success of the military goals of
Operation Desert Storm.2 37
The Court dismissed Doe's complaint without addressing the propriety
of issuing investigational drugs to military personnel. By deferring to the
judgment of the FDA, the Court appeared to have left military personnel
without an avenue of protection. The DoD need not make public its re-
quests for informed consent waivers, and the FDA need not publicize its
determinations; it is entirely possible that military personnel will be una-
228. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (1991).
229. Id. at 1381.
230. Id. at 1380-81.
231. Id.
232. 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1994).
233. Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1383.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. I& (citing Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 17 (D.D.C. 1991)).
237. Id.
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ware that their right to informed consent is being eliminated.2 38 The
Court acknowledged and validated the concerns of the Government in
deploying troops in a war zone fraught with the peril of chemical weap-
ons,2 39 yet did not address the interests of military personnel in being
able to determine whether to ingest unapproved drugs.
III. CONCLUSION
The FDA's decision to grant DoD's waiver represented the first in-
stance "since World War II that any official government agency had polit-
ically sanctioned the direct Violation of the Nuremberg Code (which
makes no exception either for members of the military or for wartime
expediencies)."24 ° Until the inclusion of Rule 23(d), the FDA rules pro-
vided for a waiver of the right to informed consent only when the subject
was incapable of giving his or her informed consent, or was in a life-
threatening situation. These laws were firmly anchored in the dictates of
ethical codes such as the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Hel-
sinki. The practice of DoD in administering LSD to unwitting,
nonvolunteer subjects for research purposes was completely repugnant to
legally and ethically accepted practices. By promulgating the military exi-
gency informed consent waiver, the FDA gave its stamp of approval to
DoD's violation of the ethical norms established at Nuremberg.
The rule promulgated by the FDA sets up relatively specific standards
by which to measure the designation of informed consent as "not feasi-
ble." The final determination is made at the Commissioner's discretion.
What is especially disturbing is that the Commissioner's determinations
were based upon the apparent misrepresentations of DoD, presumably to
ensure that the waiver request would be granted. For example, one of the
criterion that the Commissioner must take into account when reaching a
determination is "the extent and strength of the evidence of the safety
and effectiveness of the investigational drug for the intended use.",
241
There is ample evidence that the Government was unsure whether the
drugs issued were either safe or effective. Test subjects in government
research were a purified group: people taking other medications and peo-
ple who smoked or had abnormal blood pressure, or other health condi-
238. Justice Ginsburg notes that public notice need not be given by either agency as
part of her rejection of Justice Thomas' dissent that Doe's claim is moot. Id. at 1376.
239. Id. at 1377.
240. THE NAZI DocTORS AND THE NUREM1BERG CODE, supra note 54, at 216.
241. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(2)(i)(1995).
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tions, were excluded from research on pyridostigmine.242 DoD
researchers withheld from the FDA information gathered in research on
the effectiveness of various dosages of pyridostigmine in conjunction with
243atropine, and tried to prevent testimony by a USDA scientist regarding
the heightened toxicity of pyridostigmine when used in combination with
DEET.24
One of the overriding concerns of the FDA, as stated in its decision to
promulgate Rule 23(d), was that any waiver of informed consent under
the military exigency exception be in the best interest of the group.245
Most of the studies considered in the process of determining whether to
grant the waiver were conducted by DoD. Allowing the FDA to rely on
the data of any organization seeking to take away the informed consent
of a group of people creates a conflict of interest, especially when the
organization has a track record for experimenting on people without their
consent. Such a system renders the exception process almost meaning-
less. Despite the time constraints involved in a war situation, there ought
to be an independent panel of research scientists who at the very least are
responsible for questioning the validity and reliability of studies
presented by DoD.
The DoD has requested that the interim rule be turned into a blanket
waiver to use investigational drugs without informed consent in the case
of war or threat of war.246 The FDA should reject this proposition for
several reasons. First, drugs are given investigational status for a reason.
FDA approval is an important safety check on drugs. !Researchers must
obtain the informed consent of human subjects upon whom they wish to
use investigational drugs so that the subjects are aware that they are tak-
ing a risk, that the FDA has not endorsed the safety of the drug, and that
there may well be adverse consequences to their health. Second, DoD
broke its promise to the FDA that it would provide information and
warnings concerning the risks of pyridostigmine and botulism toxoid.247
242. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 28-29.
243. Id. at 26.
244. Dr. James Moss testified on May 6, 1994, before the Senate Veterans Affairs Com-
mittee hearing despite efforts by the USDA to prevent him from doing so. Id. at 32. Dr.
Moss's research revealed that when taken in conjunction with exposure to pesticides,
pyridostigmine and the pesticide both became more toxic. Dr. Moss was warned by his
supervisor at USDA not to discuss his findings with anyone, and noted the warning in an
internal memorandum. USDA and the S.C. Johnson Wax Co. invented DEET. Moss lost
his job at USDA. Id. at 33-34.
245. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 54, at 349.
246. Id. at 42.
247. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 17, at 42.
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Botulism toxoid was supposed to be administered on a voluntary basis
but was in fact mandatory.248 The FDA should not reward or encourage
such a violation. Finally, DoD should not be given free reign to use in-
vestigational drugs simply because of a state of war. Waiving the in-
formed consent of a group should not be an easy task; it should be an
exceptional process requiring a substantial showing of need.
Eroding the rights of military personnel is unethical and legally ques-
tionable. Allowing military personnel in the Gulf War to decide whether
to take investigational drugs was feasible. In his dissenting opinion in
Stanley, Justice Brennan states:
The soldier's case is instructive: Subject to most unilateral disci-
pline, forced to risk mutilation and death, conscripted without,
perhaps against, his will - he is still conscripted with his capaci-
ties to act, to hold his own or fail in situations, to meet real chal-
lenges for real stakes. Though a mere "number" to the High
Command, he is not a token and not a thing. (Imagine what he
would say if it turned out that the war was a game staged to
sample observations on his endurance, courage, or
cowardice.) 249
Claire Alida Milner
248. Id.
249. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 707-708. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing H. Jonas, Philosophi-
cal Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in Experimentation with Human
Subjects 3 (P. Freund ed., 1969)).
